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RESTORING THE PARAMETERS OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH IN A TIME OF HOBBY LOBBY AND 
EBOLA: THE CASE FOR A WELLNESS 
ACCOUNT 
JOHN D. BLUM* 
The genesis of this piece lies in two seemingly unrelated events in 
law and public health, the governmental response to the Ebola crisis, and 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, sparked by 
religious objections to certain employer mandates under the Affordable 
Care Act.1 Both episodes raise issues about the behavior of government 
authorities in the face of public health need. The presence of Ebola in the 
United States raised significant questions about how health agencies should 
address a potential population health crisis, and do so in ways that are 
respectful of public need and individual liberties.2 In Hobby Lobby, the use 
of government power to compel employers to provide eight no-cost 
prevention services for women was driven by large-scale public health 
considerations addressed in the Affordable Care Act.3 Undoubtedly the 
challenges of Ebola and women’s health are very different, but these 
matters illustrate the struggle public health regulators face in meeting 
population health needs, and balancing such responses with individual 
rights. Ebola in the United States, in particular, provides a current and 
dramatic example of the legal conflicts that arise when government is 
compelled to protect the public in ways that must incorporate group and 
individual liberties, together with scientific understanding as foundational 
elements of response. The Hobby Lobby case, on the other hand, 
demonstrates another perspective on government health policy, illustrating 
how other rights beyond due process and equal protection can impact 
current public health concerns, as this case interjects the free exercise of 
religion into the health discourse. 
                                                 
 *  Professor of Law, Beazley Institute for Health Law & Policy, Loyola University 
Chicago School of Law. 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 2. See Mark Berman, Reminder: Quarantines Still Can’t Stop Ebola from Getting 
into the U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2014/10/27/reminder-quarantines-still-cant-stop-ebola-from-getting-into-the-u-s/. 
 3. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
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Hobby Lobby departs from more traditional controversies seen in 
public health contexts in which the dilemmas of balancing common good 
and individual liberty involve parties immediately impacted by a 
government action. In Hobby Lobby, the interests of a third party skew the 
balance of rights equation; the Court concerns itself with the challenges of 
three privately held corporations, none of whom are the recipients of the 
services in question.4 The challengers, under the banner of religious liberty, 
defend their rights to their beliefs, as corporate persons, in a fashion that 
presents profound challenges to this sector moving health concerns away 
from the established rubric of public and private concerns.5 In contrast to 
Hobby Lobby, the threat of Ebola in the United States, in spite of all the 
problems it caused, sparked debates about response focused on matters of 
science, and protection of individual and collective interests.6 In the face of 
a potential crisis, it would have been hard to envision a response to Ebola 
co-opted by the interests of third parties not immediately threatened by this 
disease. While women’s health concerns may not be equated to the threat of 
a deadly infectious disease, the considerations underlying prevention and 
wellness for more than half our population are central to public health and 
should first and foremost be driven by medical science, public need, and 
personal choice. 
While this essay focuses on the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case and 
not Ebola, its core premise is that health policy is best served when 
government authorities focus strategies and responses within the parameters 
of individual and population concern.7 The Supreme Court, in dealing with 
the contraceptive mandate, opened the door to subordinating core public 
health interests to third party considerations by adopting a narrow concept 
of compelling interest that serves to confound the government role in health 
oversight.8 It will be difficult in the current legal climate to overcome the 
ascendancy of corporate interests in Hobby Lobby, empowered by the force 
of religious exercise, not resting in First Amendment jurisprudence, but in 
stringent statutory interpretation. There are legal arguments to be made 
against the holding in Hobby Lobby but they are, at best, rather weak as the 
                                                 
 4. Id. at 2759. 
 5. See Laura Bassett & Ryan J. Reilly, Supreme Court Rules in Hobby Lobby Case, 
Dealing Blow to Birth Control Coverage, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/supreme-court-hobby-lobby_n_5521444.html 
(last updated June 30, 2014, 1:59 PM). 
 6. See Testing of Potential Ebola Vaccine Begins, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB. (Feb. 11, 
2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/testing-of-potential-ebola-vaccines-
begins/article_3b2bbb88-bb9c-51da-9e88-47443bae3eac.html. 
 7. Lena H. Sun, Cost to Treat Ebola in the U.S.: $1.16 Million for 2 Patients, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2014/11/18/cost-to-treat-ebola-in-the-u-s-1-16-million-for-2-patients/. As this 
headline suggests, the cost of addressing health care issues in traditional boundaries does not 
guarantee that the issue at hand will be dealt with in ways that don’t fuel considerable 
concerns. 
 8. See infra Section 1. 
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core statute underpinning the case, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”) possesses a high bar, and politics makes it is unlikely that this 
law will be amended. Nonetheless, the public’s health necessitates an 
approach to women’s health that restores a balance between common good 
and the liberties of directly affected individuals. 
This piece will propose an alternative approach to women’s health 
promotion, a wellness account, which carves out employers from coverage 
decisions in the prevention area. Not only will the wellness account 
circumvent corporate paternalism in health, it will strengthen the promotion 
and prevention goals of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) by more 
effectively engaging individuals and clinicians in their own health 
decisions, as well as provide coverage options that include a broader array 
of health services not routinely available under the law. The essay will be 
divided into four sections. Section 1 will review the U. S. Supreme Court 
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, highlighting the core findings of the 
majority, as well as key points made by the minority. Section 2 will present 
some general reflections on the Hobby Lobby case, focusing on the free 
exercise of religion issue under RFRA, as well as an exploration of the 
compelling interest standard as it relates to women’s health. Section 3 of 
the article will explore possible avenues around the legal barriers of Hobby 
Lobby through legislative and judicial fixes, as well as alternative approach 
to the employer mandate. In Section 4 a proposal will be posited to amend 
the ACA to create a lockbox for prevention and wellness services that will 
provide a new home for women’s health services including the four 
contraceptives that sparked the Hobby Lobby litigation. It will be argued 
that removal of the coverage mandate from employer discretion is a way to 
restore the parameters of public health to matters of science, public need 
and individual patient right. 
SECTION 1: THE BASICS OF THE HOLDING 
A. The Majority 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby involved a challenge by three closely held 
corporations against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(“DHHS”).9 The three corporations involved, Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and 
Conestoga Wood Specialties, all large, privately held, family run 
companies, alleged that the employer group health insurance mandate in the 
Affordable Care Act that required them to provide coverage of four FDA 
contraceptive services that were alleged to violate their religious liberty 
under both the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, as well and the 
                                                 
 9. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. For a detailed overview of Hobby Lobby and the 
questions it raises for the free exercise of religion, see DAVID H. GANS & ILYA SHAPIRO, 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES FOR CORPORATIONS?: HOBBY LOBBY, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 42–53 (2014). 
122 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2: 119 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).10 Pursuant to 
DHHS regulations implementing the ACA, employer group plans are 
required to furnish preventive care and screening for women without cost 
sharing.11 Non-exempt employers must provide coverage for all twenty 
FDA approved contraceptive methods, including four types that were 
explicitly signaled out as being antithetical to the religious beliefs of the 
three claimants.12 The DHHS contraceptive mandate was not in the statute, 
but rather was determined administratively by the Health Resources 
Administration (“HRSA”) based on the recommendations of the Institute of 
Medicine.13 
An important backdrop to the privately held corporate objections 
was that two broad types of exemptions to the contraceptive coverage 
mandates existed. By law, many large employers and unions did not have to 
comply with the no-cost sharing women’s health coverage requirements as 
their plans, which existed prior to the ACA, were granted “grandfather 
status,” making them exempt from the law’s minimum essential benefits, 
which included the contraceptive mandates.14 DHHS had also granted an 
exemption to the contraceptive mandate to religious organizations, based on 
state law precedents, and later, a partial exemption to non-profit religious 
organizations was authorized to forestall a firestorm of controversy 
surrounding contraceptive coverage generally.15 In the case of the exempted 
organizations, their insurers and third party administrators (“TPAs”) may 
exclude contraceptive services from health plan offerings; the coverage 
responsibility shifts to the insurance entity or TPA to provide the four 
                                                 
 10. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 
 12. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762. The corporate parties objected to four types of 
contraceptives; two morning after-pills, Plan B and Ella; and two types of intrauterine 
devices (IUDs), arguing that these four prevented implantation and as such were 
“abortifacients.” See Jen Gunter, The Medical Facts About Birth Control and Hobby Lobby–
From an OB/GYN, NEW REPUBLIC (July 6, 2014), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118547/facts-about-birth-control-and-hobby-lobby-ob-
gyn. 
 13. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a), (e) (2010). DHHS was responsible for implementing 
Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act that covers, prevention and wellness. See 
Preventive Services Covered Under the Affordable Care Act, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/factsheets/2010/07/preventive-services-list.html 
(last updated Sept. 27, 2012). 
 15. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2013). There is a rather complex history of regulatory 
development concerning the exemption of employers from the contraceptive mandate 
starting with traditional religious organizations and expanding to non-profit religious 
employers. See Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
16,501 (proposed Mar. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 
C.F.R. pt. 147); Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 
8,456 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 
C.F.R. pts. 147, 148, 156). To ensure that women are covered by an exempt employer 
insured group health plan or self-insured plan, the no-cost coverage requirement for 
contraceptives was shifted to insurers and TPAs. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c). 
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challenged no cost sharing contraceptives.16 This transference was seen as 
budget neutral, due to the savings sparked by these preventive services.17 
Both the Hahn (Conestoga Wood) and Green (Hobby Lobby, 
Mardel) families sought injunctive relief in federal districts courts, claiming 
that their free exercise of religion was infringed on as a result of the DHHS 
contraceptive mandate, but in both cases relief was denied.18 The Hahns 
appealed their case to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, without success, 
as that court ruled that a for-profit corporation could not engage in religious 
exercise under either RFRA or the First Amendment, and that the mandate 
at issue was not one personally directed to the Hahns.19 Things changed in 
the federal court of appeals for the Greens, however, as the Tenth Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.20 The court 
ruled that the Greens’ businesses meet the definition of “persons” under 
RFRA, and that they had established the likelihood of success in showing 
that the contraceptive mandate was a substantial burden, causing them an 
irreparable harm.21 The court held that DHHS did not establish that the 
contraceptive mandate was the least restrictive way of furthering the 
government’s compelling interest.22 The split in the Third and Tenth 
Circuits resulted in the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari.23 
                                                 
 16. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c). 
 17. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Health Services Under the Affordable Care 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,877 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). The July 2, 2013 rules were the culmination of prior 
administrative actions in this very controversial area of rule making. See Tyler Hartsfield & 
Grace-Marie Turner, 49 Changes to Obamacare . . . So Far, GALEN INST. (Mar. 2, 2015), 
http://www.galen.org/assets/49-Changes-to-ObamaCare . . . So-Far.pdf. In turn, broader 
modifications were made for religious non-profit employers who state their objections to 
contraceptives, requiring the federal government to take over management of these benefits. 
No longer does the objection have to be made to the insurer or TPA, but it can be made 
directly to the government. See Kaiser Health News, Religious Employers Offered Fix on 
Birth Control Coverage Rules, KAN. HEALTH INST. (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://www.khi.org/news/2014/aug/22/religious-employers-offered-fix-birth-control-cove/. 
The July 2, 2013 rules were later amended to allow for greater accommodation to employer 
objections. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 
Fed. Reg. 51,092, 51,094 (Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). For an 
interesting analysis of the difficulties faced in dealing with the religious objections in the 
area of contraceptives, see Emily Bazelon, Nice Try, Obama, SLATE MAG. (Aug. 26, 2014, 
12:24 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/obama_s_new_cont
raception_mandate_accommodation_religious_employers_are.html. 
 18. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400 (E.D. Pa. 
2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1296 (W.D. Okla. 
2012). 
 19. Conestoga Wood Specialties v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 
377 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 20. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1144. 
 23. Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
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The Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case, which joined together the 
Greens’ and the Hahns’ religious objections, was based not on a 
constitutional consideration of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, 
but rather was grounded in the Court’s interpretation of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.24 Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga 
corporations argued to the Court that RFRA prohibits the government from 
substantially burdening a person’s free exercise of religion unless it is able 
to shown that the burden in question is both driven by a compelling interest, 
and constitutes the least restrictive means available to achieve the public 
goals at issue.25 
In ruling in favor of the three privately held corporations, the 
majority opinion, written by Justice Alito, covered three significant areas. 
First, the Court reached several related conclusions about the feasibility of 
the religious infringement claim under RFRA. The majority ruled that 
RFRA applies to closely held for-profit corporations, rejecting the 
government’s positions that the three companies could not sue under this 
law because they are for-profit entities, and that the owners could not 
challenge the regulations, at issue, as they applied only to companies, and 
not individuals.26 The Court reasoned that the DHHS position on the 
viability of the RFRA challenges placed these merchants in a very difficult 
situation, forcing them to give up their rights to seek judicial protection of 
their religious liberty or forego the benefits of operating as a corporation. 
Additionally, the majority held that nothing in RFRA forced a departure 
from the Dictionary Act definition of “person” including corporations.27 
The Court rejected the DHHS position that a for-profit corporation could 
not seek protection under RFRA, as the government had conceded that non-
profits could be considered “persons” under the Act.28 
The Hobby Lobby majority reasoned that state laws authorized 
corporations to pursue any lawful purpose or business, including the pursuit 
of profit in conformity with the owner’s religious principles.29 The Court 
further reasoned that First Amendment jurisprudence was not reversed by 
RFRA to a time when corporate rights in the religious context had not been 
addressed, rather this law, and its progeny, created independent religious 
rights that could clearly include for-profit corporations within its ambit.30 
                                                 
 24. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
 25. Id. at 2779; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 26. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 27. Id. at 2768. 
 28. Id. See Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 1–8 (2014). See also Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), in which the Court allowed a 
RFRA claim of a non-profit to proceed. 
 29. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. 
 30. Id. at 2772–74. RFRA was enacted in 1993 in reaction to the Supreme Court 
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). RFRA is often viewed as a statute, which rolls back the law in this area to the pre-
Smith era in which for-profit corporations did not make claims for First Amendment Free 
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The Court rejected the government’s claim that it could not ascertain the 
sincerity of corporate (religious) beliefs, reasoning that in other contexts 
(i.e., prisoners religious liberty claims) such determinations are made by 
federal courts, and that here too, the Court reasoned that state law affords 
guidance as to the limits of acceptable corporate governance.31 DHHS did 
not question the sincerity of the Greens’ and Hahns’ religious beliefs that 
life begins at conception, nor their religious opposition to the highlighted 
four contraceptives, but the agency called into question how such beliefs 
could be determined in a corporation, guided by a leadership structure that 
may have conflicting views on such matters.32 
The second major element in the Hobby Lobby ruling concerned the 
question of whether the three companies’ religious liberty was 
“substantially burdened” by the contraceptive mandate. In order for a 
successful RFRA claim to be brought the complaining parties must 
demonstrate that the government action, at issue, is a substantial burden on 
the free exercise of religion.33 The Court in Hobby Lobby was persuaded 
that the burden was substantial, based on the size of the statutory fines that 
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga would face if they offered health 
insurance that failed to provide the four contraceptive services.34 Amici in 
the case raised the argument that the three companies could avoid the fines 
by dropping health insurance and paying a $2,000 penalty per employee; a 
payment obligation resulting from employees purchasing their own health 
insurance on government exchanges.35 The government, however, never 
mounted the argument that the three companies could have circumvented 
their religious objections by forcing their employees onto public exchanges, 
thus mitigating their burden.36 Nonetheless, the Court did note that using 
the exchanges, as a way to reduce the companies’ substantial burden would 
have been unpersuasive.37 According to the Court, the plaintiffs offered 
health insurance for both religious reasons, as well as for conventional 
business considerations, and the decision to offer health coverage was a 
long standing one made by the three companies prior to the Affordable Care 
Act.38 The Hobby Lobby majority expressed doubt that the Congress, either 
                                                                                                                 
Exercise protection. The Court rejected this premise as they pointed out in Hobby Lobby that 
in the pre-Smith era, Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Markets of Massachusetts, Inc., 366 
U.S. 617 (1961) demonstrates that for-profit corporations can exercise religion. Id. at 2772. 
 31. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774–75. 
 32. Id. at 2774. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012). 
 34. The Court estimated that the fines would be annually $475 million for Hobby 
Lobby, $15 million for Mardel, and $33 million for Conestoga. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 
2776. 
 35. Brief of Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting the Government at 
22, Hobby Lobby,134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
 36. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2776. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. The Court never explained its conclusion that the three companies saw religion, 
in and of itself, as a motivating factor to offer employee health benefits. 
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through RFRA or the ACA, would place privately held corporations in a 
situation where they had to choose between violating sincerely held 
religious principles and forcing their employees to lose existing health care 
coverage.39 
The Court also rejected a key government argument that the 
connection between the religious beliefs and actual use of the four 
contraceptives was too attenuated.40 Rather, the Court characterized the 
Greens’ and the Hahns’ perception that their religion and moral philosophy 
was violated by the contraceptive mandate as sincere; according to the 
Court, characterizing this belief as insubstantial or minimal in its practical 
import, was not within the purview of the federal courts.41 As such, the 
Court found a direct link between the religious objections of the parties to 
the mandate, and the possible eventuality that it could lead to the actual use 
of one of the four objectionable contraceptives. 
The third key element in the Court’s decision concerns whether the 
government was able to justify the substantial burden on religious liberty 
under RFRA,42 and consideration of the viability of the DHHS 
justifications. Under the dictates of RFRA, based on constitutional 
jurisprudence, DHHS was required to demonstrate that the contraceptive 
mandate was motivated by a compelling interest, and that the regulatory 
approach taken, constituted the least restrictive means of achieving the goal 
in question.43 Although there is overwhelming evidence underpinning the 
value of women’s access to contraceptives, the Court never dealt with the 
public health, or gender equity, arguments made by DHHS in considering 
the “compelling interest” question, but rather characterized these defenses 
as far too broad.44 The Court’s opinion focused more extensively on 
determining whether mandating employers to provide health insurance, that 
included the four contraceptives at issue, was the least restrictive means 
available to achieve this goal of offering these services.45 Under the ACA, 
large numbers of employers, through grandfathering provisions, and 
subsequent administrative exemptions for religious entities, had been 
carved out of the contraceptive mandate.46 DHHS had created an exemption 
for non-profit religious employers that transferred the no-cost coverage 
responsibility to insurance issuers and third-party administrators.47 The 
Court identified this type of exemption as a model, which was less 
restrictive than the one proposed for the challengers.48 The government 
                                                 
 39. Id. at 2777. 
 40. Id. at 2777–78. 
 41. Id. at 2779. 
 42. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 43. Id. at 2761 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012)). 
 44. Id. at 2779. 
 45. Id. at 2780–83. 
 46. Id. at 2763–64. See § 18011(a), (e) (2012). 
 47. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c) (2013). 
 48. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782. 
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countered with the argument that enforcement of RFRA could not serve as 
a justification for new expenditures to create a less restrictive enforcement 
scheme.49 The Court strongly rejected the expenditure argument, holding 
that both RFRA, and its sister statute, RLUIPA (Religious Land Use 
Institutionalized Persons Act), could, in the interests of the free exercise of 
religion, require the expenditure of additional public funds, and such 
position was in compliance with Congressional intent.50 While the majority 
did not specify an exact approach that would meet the “least restrictive 
means test,” it did reject the strategy of having employers drop health 
insurance as a way to avoid religious conflict; in the eyes of the Court, this 
would constitute a greater impediment to a woman seeking contraceptive 
services.51 
In crafting its ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the majority was 
careful to frame its opinion narrowly by limiting its decision under RFRA 
to privately held corporations.52 But, as pointed out in the minority opinion, 
it is not entirely clear that the same reasoning applied in Hobby Lobby 
could not be adopted in a similar, future RFRA challenge, brought by a 
publically traded corporation.53 The majority was quite adamant that there 
was no boundary in RFRA that limited its application to a natural person, 
but rather the term “person” appears to permit claims by a wide array of 
actors, including for-profit corporations.54 The Court stressed that the 
decision only applied to the religious challenge against the contraceptive 
mandate, and was not to be read as opening the door to free exercise 
objections to other public health measures such as mandatory vaccines, or 
as a ruse to sanction employment discrimination.55 The Court noted that the 
RFRA compelling interest test was robust enough to act as a litmus test to 
balance religious liberty claims against competing interests more 
generally.56 But the existence of a balancing test, no matter how artful it 
maybe, does not preclude other claimants from pursuing their free exercise 
claims, spurred on by the success of the three parties in Hobby Lobby. 
B. The Minority 
Justice Ginsburg authored a bitter dissent, illustrating how badly 
divided the Court was along political and gender lines.57 Several key points 
                                                 
 49. Id. at 2781. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 2783. 
 52. Id. at 2785. 
 53. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 2759. 
 55. Id. at 2783–84. 
 56. Id. at 2784–85. 
 57. The decision was a 5–4 split with the dissent representing the liberal factions of 
the Court, in addition to reflecting a gender divide as all three women on the Court joined in 
the dissenting opinion. 
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were stressed in the dissent starting with a much more careful articulation 
and support for the Women’s Health Amendment that had acted as the 
catalyst of the contraceptive mandate.58 The dissent did not characterize 
RFRA as a starting point in the exploration of the legal analysis of 
government burdens on free exercise, but rather viewed it as a point of 
return to the body of constitutional jurisprudence that existed prior to this 
statute.59 Justice Ginsburg argued that not only had a compelling interest 
standard been in existence before RFRA, but so too had the least restrictive 
means requirement.60 The dissent took issue with the majority’s conclusion 
that a religion-based exemption could be expanded to a for-profit 
corporation.61 The pre-Smith rulings, relied on by the majority, make no 
mention of such a dramatic expansion to for-profit entities, and according to 
Justice Ginsburg, had that been Congress’ intent, it would have been 
clarified in the RFRA statute.62 The dissent also voiced concern that there is 
no way to limit the expansion of “person” to only closely held corporations, 
but the logic of the ruling extends to corporations of any size, public or 
private.63 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg noted that placing the courts into 
the role of deciphering the validity of particular religious objections made 
by for-profit corporations would be venturing into a judicial minefield, and 
could run afoul of the other pillar of religious freedom, the Establishment 
Clause.64 
The dissent was troubled by the viability of the connection between 
the Greens’ and Hahns’ religious objections to the contraceptive mandate 
and the nature of the burden placed on them.65 Justice Ginsburg noted that 
the obligation placed on the challengers was to direct money to 
undifferentiated funds that finance a wide array of benefits under 
comprehensive health plans.66 The actual decision to use a contraceptive is 
one between an employee and her physician, making the religious objection 
of the three closely held corporations less than a substantial burden. The 
                                                 
 58. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 2791. In the eyes of the dissent, RFRA and the RLUIPA amendment to 
RFRA, restored free exercise jurisprudence to a time before Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith abandoned earlier 
free exercise jurisprudence holding that when government regulations impacted religion, 
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 63. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797. 
 64. Id. at 2805. 
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dissent argued that the third-party nature of the claim was one not 
envisioned by Congress under RFRA; the decision in question was made by 
an individual and was not a direct issue that arose in the relationship 
between the three corporations and the government.67 Even if the burden on 
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga was found to be substantial, the 
dissent was persuaded that the compelling public health interest outweighs 
the employer objections, and that no prior decision has allowed a RFRA 
based exemption to harm the interests of others, particularly those whom 
the law is designed to protect.68 The dissenters rejected alternative payment 
mechanisms for contraceptives, endorsed by the majority, arguing that the 
ACA scheme for preventive services rested on the employer health 
insurance system and that moving away from that structure would impede 
women’s access to health services.69 
SECTION II: REFLECTIONS 
A. The Corporatization of Religion 
Undoubtedly the legal heart of the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case 
concerns the free exercise of religion, claimed by the three corporate 
challengers, versus the right of the government to be able to regulate 
employer health plans to achieve public health goals. While free exercise 
jurisprudence, unlike due process and equal protection, is not the daily 
fodder of constitutional concerns in public health law policy formation, it is 
nonetheless an area that has been the subject of long-standing and frequent 
concern.70 Generally disputes that occur at the intersection of health and 
constitutional law pit parties who claim individual rights, such as religion, 
against government authorities acting in the interests of the public. 
Individuals and religious organizations, under the banner of the First 
Amendment, and more recently RFRA, argue that their right to engage in 
certain conduct, or their exemption from various public mandates, be 
protected by their right to exercise their religious freedom.71 
Most often, there are three types of challenges that can be found in 
health care contexts that typify the nature of religiously based disputes: 
challenges that involve regulations, proscriptive directives, and compulsory 
                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799–2801. 
 69. Id. at 2802. 
 70. See Breitta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious 
Liberty and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82 
OR. L. REV. 641 (2003). 
 71. Such challenges can also be brought under state law, as state constitutions 
recognize the free exercise of religion and all states have enacted their own versions of 
RFRA. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 
55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010); Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses 
Under State Constitutions, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2013). 
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actions, respectively. There exists a wide array of subject matter disputes; 
from objections to mandatory vaccines, disease testing and reporting, to 
blood transfusions, bans on polygamy, etc., which populate this area. Of 
particular note are the commonly encountered controversies involving 
third-party health care institutions or individual health professionals, who as 
a matter of conscience, driven by a religious or moral objection, refuse to 
provide certain types of care, typically, those involving women’s health 
services (contraception, artificial insemination, sterilization, and 
termination of pregnancy). The ability of individuals and institutions to 
refuse to provide services, based on religious beliefs, has been underpinned 
by the passage of state statutes in the area, along with the issuance of 
federal regulations to that effect.72 From the rights of providers to limit 
services, issues of conscience have expanded into payment matters as 
employers, primarily religiously sponsored, have argued that specific 
employee health benefits that require contraceptives to be covered must be 
excluded if they conflict with religious doctrine.73 The Obama 
Administration adopted contraceptive coverage exclusion, first developed 
in the states, as a special concession to religiously based corporations that 
primarily employ and serve those of the same faith.74 The corporate 
exclusions for religious organizations fit within the framework of free 
exercise jurisprudence, but when exclusions are sought by for-profit 
companies, that espouse strong religious values, like Hobby Lobby, the law 
concerning freedom of religion enters into a previously unprecedented 
arena. 
What makes the ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby feasible is that 
the case is brought within the parameters of RFRA, as opposed to a First 
Amendment challenge. The Court in Hobby Lobby may have been able to 
frame its decision on precedent but it would have had to reject the rational 
basis test of Employment Division v. Smith, and reconfirm the strict scrutiny 
                                                 
 72. See Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: 
The Quest for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779 (2007); see also Maria Cirincione, Maryland’s Conscience Clause: 
Leaving a Woman’s Right to Health Care Provider’s Choice, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 171 (2010). Federal regulations concerning religious and moral refusal to treat can be 
found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 88.1–88.2 (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 238n 
(1996); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2209 
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interests against liberal policy makers. See Kelleen Patricia Forlizzi, State Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts as a Solution to the Free Exercise Problem of Religiously Based 
Refusals to Administer Health Care, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 387 (2010). 
 73. Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 304 (2014). 
 74. Id. at 307. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 
Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 
2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
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analysis it had developed in Sherbert. RFRA, however, gave the Court a 
statutory avenue to avoid such judicial rationalizing, and through this law, 
the Hobby Lobby majority was able to follow an alternative pathway. 
Two key factors stand out in the RFRA analysis. First, the Court 
found that RFRA was not restricted to individuals and religious entities, but 
that corporations, operating under the color of state law, could pursue 
profits in conformity with the religious values of their owners.75 Thus 
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga, as for-profit corporations, were 
protected by RFRA, and as such, had the opportunity to make the case, that 
as covered entities, their religious rights were illegally burdened by having 
to meet a mandate that was an affront to those beliefs. Even more 
significant than recognition of the three businesses as RFRA persons, was 
the fact that their claim was placed in a pre-Smith context that required the 
application of a strict scrutiny test.76 Second, the Court accepted the 
Greens’ and the Hahns’ expression of faith and reiterated it without 
question, as the judicial role requires only a finding of an “honest 
conviction.”77 The sincerity of the religious claim, coupled with the 
economic harm suffered by the challengers’ free exercise, combined to 
infringe on the religious liberty of the parties.78 Once a substantial burden 
was demonstrated, the onus under a RFRA claim shifts to the government 
to show that the regulation at issue is supported by a compelling interest, 
and that the regulatory approach followed is the least restrictive means 
available.79 RFRA supplants the rational basis test adopted in Smith, one 
that would have been easier for DHHS to meet in making the public health 
case for contraceptives. Under the less stringent rational basis test, the 
exercise of religion can be impacted by the government action at issue, 
provided this action is neutral; its object is not the suppression of religion, 
or religious conduct, and the particular action is generally applicable.80 But 
under the strict scrutiny standard of RFRA, a compelling interest has to be 
                                                 
 75. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 76. Id. at 2772–74. 
 77. Id. at 2778. A couple of curious matters have been identified in the commentary on 
the Hobby Lobby case that raise questions about the sincerity of the challengers religious 
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Company’s Retirement Plan Invests in Contraception Manufacturers, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 
1, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/hobby-lobby-retirement-
plan-invested-emergency-contraception-and-abortion-drug-makers. 
 78. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 79. Id. at 2751. 
 80. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993). 
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demonstrated that goes beyond a general public health case in support of 
women’s health prevention and wellness.81 Rather, a compelling interest 
standard requires an explicit demonstration that placing a burden on the free 
exercise of religion of the three specific corporations was necessary to solve 
the public health problem at issue, something the government failed to do in 
Hobby Lobby.82 
Compounding the difficulty in demonstrating a specific compelling 
interest was the further legal requirement that DHHS must show that its 
approach to the matter of contraceptives, that burdened the parties’ freedom 
of religion, was the least restrictive means available to deal with this 
matter.83 Here, the Agency was confronted with a major challenge, as the 
ACA allowed existing employer and union plans to be grandfathered out of 
minimum essential benefit requirements, including the provision 
concerning cost free contraceptives.84 Equally significant was the fact that, 
by regulation, an expanded number of organizations, starting with religious 
employers, were exempted from the contraceptive mandate.85 These 
exemptions were further expanded through a temporary safe-harbor; 
accommodations extended the range of exempted organizations to include a 
wide array of non-profit religious entities, such as hospitals and educational 
institutions. For these exempted employers, their workers are afforded 
alternative access to contraceptive services, as the no cost coverage 
contraceptive mandate was passed on to the employer’s insurers and third 
party administrators, who become responsible for this obligation.86 The 
many exemptions, waivers, and accommodations made it difficult for 
DHHS to convincingly argue that the contraceptive mandate could not be 
accommodated in a fashion similar to what was done for a wide swath of 
employers. The Court concluded that a least restrictive approach required 
the government to assume the cost of providing contraceptives, and that 
RFRA, and its companion statute RLUIPA, posed no barrier to an 
additional expenditure that would protect religious liberty.87 
                                                 
 81. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 82. See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficiente Unia do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 
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8,462 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 
C.F.R. pts. 147, 148, 156). 
 87. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781–82 (2014). The Court 
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B. Recapturing the Compelling Interest 
Lost in the haze of religious objections and the jurisprudence of 
RFRA was the underlying public health imperative that underpinned the 
contraceptive mandate.88 As noted the Court never seriously dealt with the 
DHHS position that the contraceptive mandate promoted public health, and 
gender equity, as it concluded that such arguments were too broad and 
lacked the requisite specificity demanded by RFRA. But in passing, the 
Court conceded that it was likely the government had a compelling interest 
in providing no cost contraceptives, but that assumption was short lived, as 
it faltered on the second prong of RFRA, the least restrictive means test.89 
The majority, in zealously protecting the RFRA religious rights of the 
Hahns’ and the Greens’, relegated the interests of women’s health to the 
status of a lesser concern, and in the process willingly compromised the 
employer based structure of the ACA. 
The minority opinion, on the other hand, is rooted in its support for 
public health and women’s well being as a compelling interest that drives 
its legal reasoning and colors its arguments in support of the contraceptive 
mandate. As noted by the minority, the Women’s Health Amendment, 
which led to the contraceptive mandate, was an addition to the ACA, in 
recognition that cost barriers impeded many women from obtaining 
necessary medical care.90 The so-called Mikulski Amendment, expanded 
one of the ACA’s core areas of focus, preventive services, broadly 
requiring new insurance plans to include coverage, without cost sharing, for 
women’s preventive care and screening services, a position taken by the 
Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”) of DHHS.91 
HRSA based its women’s preventive health services coverage policies on 
the conclusions of field experts from the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) 
who recommended that the full range of FDA approved contraceptives 
methods be provided, under the ACA, without cost.92 The IOM in its 
detailed study of women’s preventive health needs, pointed out that for 
purposes of medical care, women were under greater financial strain than 
men, and that an employer’s failure to provide cost free access to 
contraceptives could have adverse health consequences.93 Adopting HRSA 
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guidelines, the three agencies—DHHS, Treasury, and Labor—issued 
regulations requiring group health plans to include coverage, without cost 
sharing, for contraceptives, sterilization procedures, patient education, and 
counseling.94 It was quite clear from the minority opinion, and the twenty-
three amicus briefs in support of the government, that the contraceptive 
mandate was seen both as a major pillar of public health and a matter of 
gender rights.95 Justice Ginsburg stressed that the compelling interest of the 
government was met, even if the concern at issue involved only four of 
twenty contraceptive methods.96 Ginsburg emphasized that the cost 
considerations in obtaining the four contraceptives, particularly in the case 
of intrauterine devices (IUDs), posed a deterrent to access.97 In the debate 
surrounding the Women’s Health Amendment, the Senate had rejected a 
conscience rider to these amendments that would have allowed any 
employer, or health insurer, the ability to deny contraceptive coverage on 
the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions;98 this rider was 
characterized as an inappropriate interference with the practice of 
medicine.99 
While there is a fair amount of detail interlaced throughout the 
Hobby Lobby decision that supports a compelling case for public health, 
albeit unsuccessfully in the eyes of the majority, the medicine underpinning 
the challengers’ objections to the four contraceptives never received its day 
in court. The Hahns and the Greens narrowed their religious objections to 
four contraceptives: two so-called morning after pills (Plan B and Ella) and 
two IUDs, labeling them as abortifacients.100 The medical community has 
taken issue with the conclusion of the three corporations in Hobby Lobby, 
arguing that the four contraceptives in question don’t prevent implantation 
or fertilization, but rather prevent ovulation, thus not constituting abortion-
inducing devices.101 In the Amicus Brief of nine medical societies, 
including the American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, it was 
pointed out that the characterization of the four birth control devices as 
anything but contraceptives did not comport with the weight of scientific 
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evidence.102 The science, however, was not at issue in the case, as 
paradoxically, the only related point of legal inquiry rested on the sincerity 
of the corporate challengers,103 and the stance taken by the parties seemed 
to suffice; the fact that the operative religious beliefs were based on faulty 
medical information had no relevance to the Court in its deliberations of the 
RFRA claim. 
C. Hobby Lobby in a Broader Context 
While the Court may not have needed to probe the scientific 
underpinnings of the religious beliefs of the owners of Hobby Lobby, 
Mardel, or Conestoga, it would be odd to imagine that these large 
employers were not aware of the tenuous nature of their medical claims that 
the four contraceptives at issue are abortifacients. As such, it is plausible 
that the motivations driving the parties in the Hobby Lobby case may be 
found in a deeper opposition to contraception and abortion generally, or 
perhaps the case is better understood in the context of broad employer 
opposition to the Affordable Care Act, and is part of a legacy of actions that 
attack key provisions of this law. As far as the wider abortion debate, it has 
been suggested that anti-abortion groups are no longer solely focused on 
issues of “personhood,” but have broadened their strategy to include 
opposition to contraceptives as being abortifacients.104 The assault on 
contraceptives does not go so far as to support an argument that existing 
abortion laws should be expanded to cover contraceptives generally. It 
does, however, open the possibility that targeted contraceptive methods, 
such as IUDs or the morning after pill, will be treated under the umbrella of 
abortion, adding additional layers of bureaucratic complexity that could 
dissuade women from obtaining these services.105 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby is an assault on one of the core pillars of 
the ACA, the employer mandate. While Hobby Lobby contests only a small 
and discrete obligation of group insurance coverage, nonetheless, it 
represents a challenge to the integrity of the employer-based scheme. This 
successful challenge has not been a death nail to health reform, but sets a 
precedent that weakens the public commitment to women’s health, and 
invites future coverage challenges by third-party employers along similar 
grounds.106 The case can be viewed in conjunction with two other Supreme 
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Court challenges, as an accidental or deliberate strategy, which further 
erodes foundational principle of the ACA.107 In National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, the best-known challenge to the ACA, a 
coalition of businesses attacked the law’s individual mandate as being in 
violation of the commerce clause, and the ACA expansion of Medicaid as 
being at odds with the federal spending power, both areas constituting key 
features of health reform.108 While the Court upheld the individual mandate 
under the taxing power, the ACA was damaged by the finding that the 
Medicaid expansion was coercive and constituted an abuse of the 
Congress’s spending power.109 A third major case, emerging from four 
federal court actions brought by employers and individual taxpayers, King 
v. Burwell, was heard by the Supreme Court in the 2015 spring term; the 
case concerns the legality of an IRS rule that allows premium subsidies for 
individuals purchasing health insurance on Federally Facilitated 
Marketplaces.110 At its root the King case is an Administrative Procedure 
Act dispute, concerning agency abuse of discretion in the implementation 
of the ACA tax credit provisions.111 The challengers in King argue that the 
plain meaning rule must dictate the interpretation of ACA language as 
limiting health insurance subsidies only to state run insurance 
marketplaces.112 If the Court rules in favor of the challengers, it is estimated 
that health insurance could become unaffordable for many of the 7.3 
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million who are expected to receive federal subsidies in 2016.113 In 
addition, without subsidies, healthier individuals may decide to drop 
coverage leaving federal exchanges with sicker and costlier enrollees. As 
such, a ruling in King that strikes down agency discretion would seriously 
cripple the ACA’s goal of expanding health insurance coverage and further 
subject the reform scheme to the idiosyncrasies of federalism.114 While each 
of the three cases noted present distinct challenges to the ACA, to date, 
collectively, they constitute the most significant legal challenges against the 
reform law and represent a body of cases underpinned by very strong 
corporate opposition to key elements of Obamacare. 
SECTION III: GOING FORWARD 
Whatever the motivations underlying Hobby Lobby—abortion 
politics, opposition to the ACA, or the corporatization of religious liberty—
the impacts of the decision on women’s health and the employer mandate 
are troubling. Perhaps the most disturbing implication of Hobby Lobby is 
that it elevates the interests of a third party to a level of import that 
confounds the abilities of government to craft public health policy within 
the traditional framework that balances individual liberties against 
population need. As previously noted, the Ebola outbreak was a stark 
reminder that public health policy is urgent, and in the chaos of the moment 
a clear understanding of legal power, the legitimate role of science, and the 
parameters of public and private interests are critical for effective 
governance.115 In this regard, the Ebola outbreak, for all of its messiness, 
serves as a reminder that a focus, on the noted core elements, is what should 
drive health policy. One would be hard pressed in the Ebola context to 
argue that a philosophical or moral concern should impede authorities from 
taking whatever actions are necessary to protect the common good. 
Unquestionably religion is a core liberty that must be respected, but that 
liberty rests with an individual’s free exercise, and to embellish this right 
for the benefit of an artificial structure, a for-profit business, is problematic 
for both the law and population health. The fact that public 
accommodations can be found to appease the interests of a third-party 
employer is not a necessary or appropriate compromise, but rather weakens 
the government’s role at a time when public health threats are ever present, 
expanding and potentially cataclysmic. In addition, the Court does a grave 
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disservice to women’s health, sacrificing this critical arena of public health 
to the vicissitudes of belief, rendering medicine and professional judgment 
secondary to convictions based on principles outside the realm of evidenced 
based analyses. 
Given the dire implications of Hobby Lobby for public health, the 
questions arise about what can be done to restore appropriate governance in 
this area. To this end, three possible approaches come to mind, none of 
which will be easily accomplished, but all of which deserve consideration 
as possible avenues around this holding. The first approach involves a 
legislative fix through statutory amendments to RFRA. The Court was quite 
adamant that in its interpretation of the Dictionary Act that the term 
“person” in RFRA was not limited to natural persons, but could include an 
array of entities including corporations, leaving the impression that any 
business entity would qualify for protections afforded by this law.116 The 
Court reasoned that if the Congress wanted to limit the scope of RFRA, it 
would have done so in the statutory language.117 The concession by DHHS 
that “person” within the RFRA context encompassed a non-profit 
corporation placed the government in a difficult position, making an 
argument that the RFRA person was restricted an unlikely conclusion.118 
While the notion that a for-profit corporation can exercise religious freedom 
in a way that trumps a public program seems odd, RFRA is silent on this 
point and the judicial interpretation of inclusiveness, in the absence of 
specific language to the contrary, is hard to overcome. Narrowing the scope 
of RFRA to include only natural persons, as the minority suggests, is an end 
that could only be achieved by amending the language of this statute.119 It 
would appear based on the expansive nature of RFRA that a roll back of the 
law to limit its application to natural persons and non-profit religious 
organizations would be politically unfeasible.120 
A second approach to changing the ruling in Hobby Lobby would 
be for the Court to alter its approaches to RFRA and the free exercise clause 
generally. Two possible avenues emerge; one would be the return to the 
jurisprudence of Smith, and the other would be the re-adoption of a 
balancing test for deciding questions of government infringement on 
religious rights. Such judicial alterations in the RFRA context would be 
rather difficult in lieu of the fact that a core purpose of the law was to 
override Smith, returning to an earlier jurisprudence that utilized a 
compelling interest standard. To turn the clock back on RFRA, without 
amending this law, would require the Court to adopt a much narrower view 
                                                 
 116. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014). Interestingly, Hobby 
Lobby was a company that was held in a management trust and in effect the Court expanded 
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 117. Id. at 2768. 
 118. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354), at 7–
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 119. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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of the statute than was the case in Hobby Lobby.121 For a pure First 
Amendment constitutional challenge, independent of RFRA, it would be 
more plausible, though unlikely, for the Court to continue the Smith 
decision seeing that the case still holds precedential value.122 Use of the 
Smith balancing test, that saves neutral and generally applicable laws from 
strict scrutiny, would be an easier bar for the government to meet in support 
of employer coverage mandates. Under a balancing test only laws directly 
targeting religious beliefs would be in jeopardy, and laws that place a 
burden on religion, as a secondary impact, could stand.123 Based on the 
reasoning of the minority opinion in Hobby Lobby, that found a compelling 
interest in the government’s case under RFRA, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the necessary elements of the Smith rational basis standard 
could be satisfied, in support of a broad, generic women’s health mandate, 
should such a standard be revised. 
The fusing of RFRA and the First Amendment, as demonstrated by 
Hobby Lobby, makes it unlikely that the Court, in light of its current 
jurisprudence, will return to a rational basis test followed in Smith.124 As 
such, the question arises as to whether there is another possible way for the 
Court to reach a different result, using the three elements of RFRA, resting 
on the long-standing Sherbert test, but following the reasoning voiced by 
Justice Ginsburg. Outside of federal courts, guidance for a different 
interpretation of the three-part rational basis test can be found in 
consideration of state court free exercise jurisprudence. States have adopted 
a more stringent view of the freedom of religion, using federal law as a 
floor on which to build stricter free exercise policies, resting on the 
idiosyncrasies of a given state’s constitution.125 For example, Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Washington State Constitution provides a more 
affirmative protection of the freedom of religion than the First 
Amendment.126 Washington State’s constitutional law broadly limits 
government power that both directly, and indirectly, impacts the free 
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exercise of religion, subjecting challenged actions to a strict scrutiny 
analysis.127 Interestingly Washington State rejected the balancing approach 
of Smith, and adopted the older Sherbert test for state constitutionality 
purposes in Munns v. Martin, a standard that mirrors the federal RFRA 
law.128 But unlike the federal application of strict scrutiny, driven by a 
narrow, targeted, compelling interest, Washington State courts have been 
more accommodating than their federal counterparts, allowing laws that 
promote medical services to stand in the interests of the public’s health, 
provided that they are narrowly tailored.129 It appears in the Washington 
situation that the state police power function, that broadly drives health 
regulation, may serve as a motivating variable, and even in the face of strict 
scrutiny, religiously based objections can be set aside in the face of health 
needs. While police power is rooted in the concept of federalism,130 the 
goals of governments at all levels is to promote population interests,131 and 
in that vein courts may give deference to those efforts yielding to legitimate 
public health purposes, even in the face of strict scrutiny analysis. State 
jurisprudence, such as that noted in Washington State, may prove helpful in 
crafting a middle pathway between the poles of Smith and RFRA, but the 
need for such compromises may not as yet be apparent to federal jurists. 
The third possible avenue for altering the Hobby Lobby decision 
can be addressed through changes in the employer mandate.132 There are 
some who have suggested that the Hobby Lobby decision shines a light on 
the inadequacy of a system that relies on employer coverage, and by giving 
employers power to alter services delineated in essential benefits, it erodes 
the integrity of the health reform scheme.133 As such, it has been argued that 
a national health insurance structure needs to move away from a 
dependency on employer coverage, and adopt a single payer approach.134 
While there may be merit in the larger idea of abandoning employer based 
health insurance, the reality is that the Affordable Care Act, as presently 
constituted, could not exist without integration of the current employee 
health benefit scheme, and attempts to move away from such a structure 
would require a considerably different health reform architecture. It seems 
unlikely that the current federal and state health insurance marketplaces 
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have the ability, in the short term, to absorb the pressure of millions of 
transferred enrollees who would be dependent on exchanges should 
employer based coverage be abandoned. In addition, there is widespread 
general support for employer based health plans that makes a retreat from 
this pillar of ACA coverage even less likely.135 
If abandonment of the employer mandate is not feasible, the 
question arises as to whether this mandate can somehow be changed. The 
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga push back on contraceptive coverage 
occurred in the context of an employer mandate littered with exceptions. As 
noted, so-called grandfathered plans fell out of the minimum essential 
benefits requirements. In addition, DHHS authorized its Health Resources 
Administration (HRSA) to establish exemptions for an array of religious 
employers, instead requiring insurers and TPAs to offer no cost coverage 
options for contraceptive services.136 In essence, the mandate became a 
veritable swiss cheese requirement, and the government’s regulatory action 
presented the Court with a less restrictive alternative option, which 
conditioned the contraceptive coverage obligation in a manner that rendered 
it highly compromised. The most logical avenue to follow, for the sake of 
women’s public health interests, and the integrity of the law, would be to 
reinvigorate the employer coverage mandate for contraceptives services, 
refusing exemptions from this obligation for any reason. In effect, the 
health mandate could be seen as an absolute legal requirement, which 
trumps the odd notion that corporations have the same personal rights as 
individual citizens. Both for-profit and non-profit entities enjoy 
considerable benefits under federal and state laws, and corporate legal 
status, of all types, is a privilege that comes with commensurate rights and 
obligations; one of which should entail an obligation to meet the minimum 
essential benefit requirements of the ACA. 
The reality is, however, that in the face of religious objections in 
areas involving women’s health and reproduction, the government has 
capitulated and waivered from its commitment to prevention and wellness, 
granting a far too wide array of actors exemption from the contraceptive 
mandate.137 It is a slippery slope, as the voices against the mandate have 
served to push the boundaries beyond the concession of allowing third 
parties a government financed opt out, to a point where even a required 
filing of an objection to the mandate has been characterized as a violation 
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of free exercise.138 What seemed to be the least restrictive way of 
approaching women’s public health needs in Hobby Lobby was quickly 
turned on its head, as the endorsed workaround requiring submission of a 
form to insurers (TPAs) was temporarily enjoined by the Court, giving 
credence to an argument that formally invoking the exemption to the 
mandate, in and of itself, violated free exercise rights.139 In such a climate it 
seems unlikely that the government will find the resolve to withstand the 
firestorm of religious objections to bolster the public health mission of the 
ACA and reinvigorate the mandate as a much more broader based 
obligation for all employers to meet, without exception. 
SECTION IV: RESTORING PUBLIC HEALTH: A WELLNESS ACCOUNT 
As noted, none of the three avenues highlighted, statutory 
amendment, judicial reversal, or reinvigoration of the employer mandate 
can be achieved easily. But the need to find a way forward to rebalance 
public health governance within the parameters of population need, and 
individual right, remains a strong imperative, particularly as it relates to 
women’s access to contraceptives. One possible way of proceeding in the 
face of the Hobby Lobby ruling, and the growth of third-party voices in the 
contraceptive area, is to reconsider whether the goals of wellness and 
prevention can be balanced with employer coverage in ways that are not 
focused on just achieving government accommodation to corporate 
interests. Two key elements, the employer mandate, and the goal of 
women’s health via prevention and wellness, need to remain paramount as 
drivers of any solution to the public health barrier created by Hobby Lobby. 
Any change in the contraceptive mandate area will entail amendments to 
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the ACA; in order to be feasible, such alterations of the law must be 
relatively minimal, not alter the basic structure of the reform scheme, and 
be politically doable. In addition, a way forward must proceed without the 
expectation that there will be changes in free exercise jurisprudence, either 
constitutional or statutory, for, as noted, such possibilities are unlikely. 
Taking into account the three conditions above, a solution that 
would restore the playing field can be achieved by removing wellness and 
prevention services from the framework of the current, minimum essential 
benefits scheme.140 In lieu of mandating wellness and prevention as one of 
the ten minimum essential benefits in the ACA, the 15 required, cost-free 
prevention services, could be culled out, together with women’s health care, 
and placed in a distinct bundle of services.141 This new service cluster could 
be referred to as a wellness account, following a format similar in 
conception to a health savings account.142 The wellness account would act 
as a type of health care lockbox, supported by a small percentage of 
insurance premium dollars, but primarily financed with current federal 
funds, already allocated to prevention and wellness.143 These new accounts 
would be established for women, and could conceivably expanded to 
include special male health needs at some point; they would enable 
individuals, with support of their physicians, to select from a menu of no 
cost, preventative health benefit offerings. All insurance policies would be 
required to include wellness accounts, including individual, small business, 
and group policies; employers would have no control over either the 
complement of services or an individual’s use of these wellness accounts. 
In addition to “traditional” wellness and prevention services, that would 
include all FDA approved contraceptives, other, additional wellness options 
could also be added. In effect, the health insurance offered under the ACA 
(including ERISA plans) becomes a type of public/private hybrid product, 
with the wellness account being the public component of the offering, a 
mandatory rider include in all policies. While the government will need to 
subsidize wellness accounts, it is conceivable that utilization of a carefully 
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designed package of preventative services could foster individual health 
maintenance, and stave off costly health insurance expenditures. 
A wellness account approach is a carve out that removes the ability 
of an employer to object to the purchase of health insurance that covers 
contraceptive services that clash with religious beliefs, falling outside the 
ambit of employer coverage. Access to contraceptives fits within a 
supplemental lockbox, and the choice to use the included prevention and 
wellness services in such a lockbox, including various methods of 
contraception, is a matter of personal selection and individual right, 
removed from the free exercise scruples of third-party corporations. The 
wellness account would do more than restore the matter of women’s health 
to the more characteristic parameters of employee health benefit choice and 
privacy, but holds the potential to enhance the health promotional goals of 
the ACA. More broadly, the wellness account is compatible with 
Obamacare’s foci on patient centric care, as well as team based medicine 
and service coordination, and could provide a valuable tool in the 
Administration’s quest to build new delivery models.144 
While the ACA advances a number of no cost preventative health 
measures as a core feature of the law’s minimum essential benefits and 
Women’s Health Amendments, the scheme could do more to affirmatively 
support utilization of these services. A core principal of health wellness is 
the need for patient engagement, as experience in this area has 
demonstrated that individual cooperation is a key variable in prevention.145 
While providing certain services without cost sharing incentivizes patients 
to seek care, additionally, a wellness account shifts responsibility and 
choice to individuals, as its use requires patients to be actively engaged in 
charting key aspects of their own health care. The account could be 
structured to provide additional services to individuals, and afford financial 
rewards for the insured that utilize this service package. A wellness account 
would require the individual to work with a clinician who would assist with 
selection and coordination of given services. The provider, in turn, could be 
incented to coordinate the wellness package, and a pay for performance 
arrangement, seen in various ACA demonstrations, could be extended into 
this arena.146 In the matter of contraceptives, coverage would be placed in 
the wellness account lockbox and incentives would be provided to women 
and their caregivers to select these services based on health factors and a 
woman’s choice. 
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The wellness account, proposed herein, is shaped on the more 
conventional formats of medical savings accounts but departs from these 
models, as it is not a tax savings vehicle.147 It may, however, be structured 
in ways that recognize utilization of preventative services by offering 
individuals expanded coverages in the next calendar year, provided 
wellness services had been used, and could further reward individuals for 
the creation of a coordinated care plan to augment their wellness accounts. 
As noted, the wellness account would also be expanded to include men and 
their particular health needs. This template also affords the opportunity to 
explore more routine insurance coverage for non-traditional, licensed 
therapies and provide a forum in which to vet the efficacies of an array of 
complimentary treatment modalities.148 In addition, the rather complex 
rules involving non-discrimination in wellness plans would not apply to the 
idea being posited here.149 Practically speaking, details concerning a 
wellness account would need to be carefully evaluated in reference to 
potential discrimination, as well as an array of other applied legal matters 
such as employment law, tax issues, and insurance regulations. As noted, 
the creation of a wellness account would require amendments to the 
Affordable Care Act and commensurate regulatory and bureaucratic 
development to allow for the implementation of this new supplemental 
insurance vehicle. 
 SECTION V: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
If the recent past is a guide, the field of public health holds many 
diverse and profound challenges, and government actors will be hard 
pressed to meet demands from areas as complex as pandemics to global 
warming as they attempt to strike a balance with more traditional core 
functions in health monitoring, assessment, and treatment.150 The Ebola 
threat in the U.S. (and around the globe) is a dramatic example of the types 
of pressures that await health authorities, and an illustration of how the 
parameters of health decision making need to be coalesced around science, 
population protection, and individual liberties. While the stakes in public 
health policy generally may not be as high as those faced in Ebola, 
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nonetheless the exercise of government police power across all key areas of 
this critical role of government should not be compromised in ways that 
detract from the work at hand. 
Health promotion is an essential, long-standing arena of public 
health concern, driven by individual and population considerations, and 
now by the access, cost, and quality goals of the Affordable Care Act. 
Within the framework of wellness a critical area of focus is women’s 
health, and within the panoply of services that classification covers, none is 
more critical than the availability of contraceptives.151 The public health 
obligations to women’s health promotion, and all that entails, including 
access to contraceptive services, are central goals of health policy, and 
those goals must be pursued with the same ardor and urgency as other more 
immediate public health challenges.152 This is not to suggest that health 
policy making in women’s health or other arenas of health promotion can 
occur without a keen awareness of legal and moral parameters, and that 
compromises must be made to advance public welfare. In particular, 
individual liberties must not be seen as extraneous to public health policy 
formation, but are integral considerations in development and execution of 
these endeavors. To argue against the inclusion of matters such as the 
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Contraception is Critical Preventive Health Care for Women 
 Contraceptive use is nearly universal among women of reproductive age in the 
United States. Most women have the biological potential for pregnancy for over 30 
years of their lives, and for approximately three-quarters of her reproductive life, 
the average woman is trying to postpone or avoid pregnancy. 
 Planned pregnancies—which for most women require contraception—improve 
women’s health. The ability to determine the timing of a pregnancy can prevent a 
range of pregnancy complications that can endanger a woman’s health, including 
gestational diabetes, high blood pressure, and placental problems, among others. 
 An unintended pregnancy may have significant implications for a woman’s health. 
A preexisting health condition such as diabetes, hypertension, reflux esophagitis, 
lower extremity or lumbar arthritis, and coronary artery disease, may be worsened 
by a pregnancy. 
 Contraception is critical to helping women achieve healthy pregnancies. Women 
who wait for some time after delivery before conceiving their next child lower 
their risk of adverse perinatal outcomes, including low birth weight, preterm birth, 
and small-for-size gestational age. And a planned pregnancy affords women an 
opportunity to make behavioral changes that lead to better birth outcomes. 
 Many contraceptives have significant preventive benefits beyond their 
contraceptive benefits. Oral contraceptives, for example, lower rates of pelvic 
inflammatory disease, cancers of the ovary and endometrium, recurrent ovarian 
cysts, benign breast cysts, and fibroadenomas. 
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freedom of religion defies our legal tradition, but religious rights must be 
appropriately invoked by those who legitimately possess them, and should 
not inappropriately coopt legitimate concerns of governance. 
The Supreme Court decision in Hobby Lobby upends the field of 
public health by allowing the free exercise rights of unrelated third parties 
to trump population health goals and the individual liberty concerns of 
women who are directly impacted by the contraceptive mandate.153 The 
minority opinion in Hobby Lobby reflects the nature of the push back 
against this decision generally, and provides a skillful articulation of the 
reasons why, in both legal and public health terms, the government’s 
position should have been viewed as compelling. While the Court found a 
less restrictive pathway to meet the government’s goals for women’s health, 
ironically it was DHHS that opened this door as a result of its liberal grant 
of exemptions to the contraceptive mandate. While such appeasement may 
have been viewed as a practical necessity, it was not compelled by law, and 
in retrospective, only served to weaken the government’s public health 
objectives. It is not outside the realm of possibility that a future court may 
view the RFRA statute as less empowering, and not so expansive as to 
include a corporation within its scope. But, for the present, it must be 
conceded that it will be difficult to overcome the Hobby Lobby 
interpretation of RFRA, and its narrowly tailored approach to compelling 
interest presents a very high bar to regulators. Rather, in the wake of Hobby 
Lobby, it seems that the expansive view of “person” articulated by the 
Court under RFRA is likely to be expanded beyond the scope of privately 
held corporations to other for-profit corporate actors, posing even greater 
problems. 
Public health challenges, whether they be the threat of Ebola, or the 
critical needs of women to access contraceptives will persist, and so it is 
essential that our legal system facilitate, and not hamper, how policy 
makers craft responses in these areas. In the face of Hobby Lobby, and its 
embellishment of corporate religious rights as of primary import, alternative 
strategies to public health must be developed to circumvent this new status 
quo. The wellness account recommended herein, is not a bold legal plan, 
but rather a mild alteration of the ACA that seeks to remove employers 
from the arch of decision making in the health prevention area. It is, 
however, not just an accommodation, but rather a measure rooted in public 
health, allowing for reproductive health decisions to be matters of health 
care treatment and individual choice. While Hobby Lobby may serve to 
meet the interests of religious rights for a new group of actors, it does a 
disservice to the public’s health, and as such, underscores the need for 
immediate and practical regulatory solutions; a wellness account is one 
such solution. 
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